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international relations, Cardiff University School of Law & Politics, Cardiff, Wales,  
United Kingdom. 
 
Abstract 
The article identifies some gaps in the institutional framework of the Africa’s Integrated 
Maritime (AIM) Strategy, with regards to certain vital areas of concerns in the sea, such as 
maritime security enforcement, an African international judicial mechanism dealing with 
marine matters, the outer limits of the Continental Shelf and the deep seabed regime. It argues 
for a reconsideration of the AIM Strategy with regard to these important law of the sea issues 
and for the provision of a clearer plan on putting together appropriate institutions to engage 
with these key matters. 
 
 ‘In the 21st century, capable, reliable and transparent institutions are the key to success 
…Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions.’ President Obama (2009)1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The African Union (AU) Assembly, with an emphasis on the geostrategic importance of the 
seas and oceans in the socioeconomic development of Africa, adopted the Africa’s Integrated 
Maritime (AIM) Strategy on the 31st January 2014 at its twenty-second ordinary session.2 The 
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1
 See REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT [President Obama] TO THE GHANAIAN PARLIAMENT, Accra 
International Conference Center Accra, Ghana, July 11, 2009, (available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-Ghanaian-Parliament/, accessed 
on 8 September 2015) 
2
 DECISION ON THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE 2050 AFRICA’S INTEGRATED MARITIME STRATEGY (2050 AIM STRATEGY), Doc. 
Assembly/AU/16(XXII) Add.1, Assembly/AU/Dec.496(XXII) of 31 January 2014, (available at 
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AIM Strategy, which is an African driven long term and reasonably comprehensive vision 
crafted to better harness Africa's so-called ‘blue economy,’3 with the vision of using this to 
promote development in the Continent, is undoubtedly a huge achievement.  The Peace and 
Security Council of the AU had previously noted that: ‘the future of Africa, among other 
sectors, resides in her blue economy, which is a new frontline of Africa's renaissance.’4 It is 
nonetheless, worth mentioning that this is not the first time that Africa has put forward a 
Continent wide strategy on marine matters. In 1974 the Declaration of the Organization of 
African Unity on the issues of the law of the sea was adopted by the Council of Ministers of 
the then Organization of African Unity (OAU) at its twenty-first ordinary session.5In the 
preamble of this Declaration the OAU affirmed that it was its ‘responsibility to harness the 
natural and human resources of [the African Continent] for the total advancement of [the 
African] peoples in all spheres of human endeavor’ and that ‘African countries have a right to 
exploit the marine resources around the African continent for the economic benefit of African 
peoples.’ 6 This Declaration then set out a strategy in respect of important areas of the law of 
the sea such as the territorial sea and straits, regime of islands, exclusive economic zone(EEZ) 
concept, including exclusive fishery zone, regional arrangements, fishing activities in the high 
seas, training and transfer of technology, scientific research, preservation of the marine 
environment, as well as the international regime and international machinery for the seabed 
and ocean floor and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 7  Admittedly, this 
document put together by the OAU, in comparison to the AIM Strategy, was rather limited. 
First, it appeared to have been a strategy document limited merely to law of the sea issues, 
while the AIM Strategy not only explores law of the sea issues, but goes further to deal with 
what could be regarded as falling more into the category of what might technically be regarded 
as maritime law.8 Second, the OAU Declaration appeared to be focused more on the adoption 
                                                 
http://pages.au.int/sites/default/files/Decision%20on%20the%20Adoption%20of%20the%202050%20AIM%20
Strategy_2.pdf, accessed on 8 September 2015)   
3
 The Small Island Developing States (SIDS) Action Platform notes that the Blue Economy is: “founded in line 
with the concept and principles of, and mutually supportive with the Green Economy, is a tool that offers 
specific mechanisms for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and coastal countries to address their 
sustainable development challenges.” (available at 
http://www.sids2014.org/index.php?page=view&type=13&nr=59&menu=1515 , accessed on 6 January 2016) 
4
 Communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 387th meeting on the 
Conclusions of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Commission of the 
Gulf of Guinea (CGG) on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea, held in Yaoundé, on 24 and 25 
June 2013, (available at http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/communique-of-the-peace-and-security-council-of-
the-african-union-au-at-its-387th-meeting-on-the-conclusions-of-the-summit-of-heads-of-state-and-government-
of-the-economic-community-of-central-african-states-eccas-the-economic-community-of-west-african# , 
accessed on 8 September 2015)   
5
 Doc.A/CONF.62/33 of 19 July 1974, UNCLOS III, Official Records, Vol.3, pp.63-65 
6
 Preambles 1 and 9, Ibid at p.63 
7
 Ibid at pp.63-65 
8 Encyclopedia Britannica points out: ‘Although etymologically maritime law and “law of the sea” are identical, 
the former term is generally applied to private shipping law, whereas the latter, usually prefixed by 
“international,” has come to signify the maritime segment of public international law.’ (available at 
http://www.britannica.com/topic/maritime-law , accessed on 8 September 2015) However, see Philip Jessup, 
‘The united nations conference on the law of the sea’, (1959)59 Columbia Law Review, 234 at 234 who appears 
not to agree that there is any such distinction.  
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of some kind of African strategy to espouse a common position on issues of the law of the sea 
with regard to UNCLOS III,9 unlike the AIM Strategy which is a more open-ended and long 
term strategy. Third, the OAU document was more of an out-looking document announcing 
Africa’s common position to other States and regions of the world.10 The AIM Strategy, on the 
other hand, appears to be mainly inward looking dealing with the crucial question - how does 
Africa harness the full potential of its rich marine resources to promote African development?11 
Fourth, the OAU document was rather limited in terms of content - a mere 3 pages - unlike the 
AIM Strategy that is quite comprehensive, covering up to some thirty pages. In addition, the 
AIM Strategy comes across as a living document - meant to evolve and be improved on.  With 
this in mind the article seeks to identify certain institutional gaps in the AIMS with regards to 
the following: maritime security enforcement; an African judicial institution dealing with 
marine issues; the outer limit of the continental shelf and deep seabed activities in the deep 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction (the Area), which may have an impact on the 
implementation of the vision of promoting an effective blue economy. Generally, the article 
would seek to promote a linkage between the AIMS and existing institutions in order to save 
costs that would be incurred by establishing brand new bespoke institutions, with proposals 
that the mandate and competence of these existing institutions be expanded.  It is, however, 
apposite at this stage to note that for the purposes of this paper, the word – institution – is not 
used in any technical sense, but rather in a broad sense to refer to some sort of organization, 
body or organ that may take up the responsibility for coordinating the implementation of some 
key matters raised expressly or implicitly in the AIMS.12   
 
II. SOME GAPS IN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN THE AIM STRATEGY 
(a) Maritime security 
The AIM Strategy deals with important maritime security issues, such as piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, maritime terrorism, human trafficking and human smuggling, illegal bunkering 
and crude oil theft, money laundering, illegal arms and drug trafficking as well as 
environmental crimes.13  However, presently, the African Union (AU) does not have an African 
joint naval task force and/or joint coast guard operations to deal with piracy and armed robbery 
                                                 
9
 See the Preambles 5 and 6 of the Declaration which states: Aware that many African countries did not 
participate in the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences’, ‘Aware that Africa, on the basis of solidarity, 
needs to harmonize her position on various issues before the forthcoming United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea due to be held at Caracas, Venezuela, in 1974, and to benefit therefrom.’(See n.5 above) 
10
 See Preamble 15, Ibid, which ‘…noted the positions and the views of other States and regions’ and then goes 
on to declare the OAU’s position on various issues on the law of the sea. 
11
 The AIM Strategy however does have a minor part that appears to have an outward perspective. Paragraph 98 
of the Strategy states that the ‘… AU shall push for a right-sized representation of the African continent in the 
various organs of marine related international institutions, so as to ensure that the voices of Africa are properly 
heard in relevant international forums.’  
12
 See for instance, Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International norm dynamics and political 
change’, (1998)52(4) International Organization, 887 at 891 and Beth Simmons and Lisa Martin, ‘International 
organizations and institutions’ in Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth Simmons (eds), Handbook of 
International Relations (2001) 2nd ed. 192 at 192-194 
13
 See Christian Bueger, ‘What is maritime security?’ (2015) 53 MP 259-164 for an interesting analysis on what 
constitutes maritime security. 
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at sea and other maritime security issues occurring in the African Maritime Domain (AMD). It 
is noted that with the East African region piracy, though this is occurring, metaphorically, in 
the ‘backyard’ of Africa, there has been no African joint naval task force to engage with this 
issue. This is in sharp contrast to several coalition military forces outside the African continent 
that were set up and are actually engaged in counter-piracy efforts in the East African region, 
such as the EU NAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta, the NATO’s Operation Open Shield and the 
Combined Maritime Forces, a US-led international naval coalition of twenty-seven 
states.14Although, there are undeniably actions being taken by certain individual African states’ 
naval force to seek to provide maritime security in East Africa, as well as at the ‘new’ maritime 
insecurity hotspot, the Gulf of Guinea, there is no doubt that having a joint AU naval task force 
would be more effective, especially with the AIMS, a strategy which appears to seek to achieve 
an ‘African solution to African problems’ as regard to maritime security around the AMD. 15A 
joint AU naval task force would allow for a pooling of naval military assets and personnel, a 
sharing of cost thereby reducing the financial burden on individual states and this would 
obviously enable such task force to cover and secure a wider area of the AMD.16 It would also 
have the advantage of providing a platform for the various participating African naval forces 
to learn and share best practices with each other. Further, it would help to assuage the concerns 
by certain African coastal States of the expansionist tendencies of other states engaged in 
unilateral naval operations, especially in regions outside their immediate sphere of influence. 
For instance, in response to a news report that the South African navy intends to deploy 
warships to deal with maritime security issues in the Gulf of Guinea, one of the commentaries, 
indicates such concern by stating that it: ‘…is best iif (sic) South Africa stays in SADC and 
Nigeria stays in ECOWAS, because the moment SA comes to ECOWAS, Nigeria will also 
move to SADC. Don’t do to others what you don’t want for yourself.’17  In addition, it would 
allow the AU to engage effectively with maritime security issues in the AMD that international 
naval coalition are, for one reason or the other, unwilling or unable to engage with. In 2011, 
Commander Baker of the US navy, after identifying various multinational counter-piracy naval 
operations involved in curbing piracy in the Somalia area pointed out that: 
'While these [International] task forces bring the benefit of nonstop maritime patrols, they 
do not involve Africans in their operations, and they do not address crimes that are of high 
importance to Africa, namely, illegal fishing and illegal dumping. As a result, they do not 
forge trust and partnerships; rather, they are viewed with indifference in many parts of 
                                                 
14
 Edwin Egede, ‘Piracy and the East African Region,’ in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas(eds.), The Law 
and Practice of Piracy at Sea: European and International Perspectives, (2014) 249 at 258-259 
15
 See Deane-Peter Baker, ‘The South African Navy and African Maritime Security’, (2012) 65(2) Naval War 
College Review 145 at 150-152; Lisa Otto, ‘South Africa’s engagement in Counter-Piracy’, November 2014, 
Maritime Executive, (available at http://www.maritime-executive.com/article/South-Africas-Engagement-in-
CounterPiracy-2014-11-08, accessed on 8 September 2015) and Ali Kamal-Deen, ‘The Anatomy of Gulf of 
Guinea Piracy’, (2015) 68(1) Naval War College Review, 93 at 107 
16
 See Kamal-Deen, Ibid at p.167 expressing concerns about the limited capabilities of the Navy of individual 
coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea to effectively patrol their extensive maritime zones.  
17
 DefenceWeb, ‘Africa’s west coast is next Navy anti-piracy deployment’, 25 September 2014, (available at 
http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36370:africas-west-coast-is-
next-navy-anti-piracy-deployment&catid=108:maritime-security , accessed on 30 December 2014) 
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Africa, where governments and communities are very reluctant to take action against 
African pirates.' 18  
 
In fairness, the AIM Strategy does recognise this vacuum created by the absence of an African 
naval task force and advocates the need to take steps: 
‘…toward promoting inter-agency and transnational cooperation and coordination on 
maritime safety and security shall include the development of an inter-agency approach, a 
Naval Component capacity within the framework of the African Standby Force (ASF), and 
the establishment of a representative continental working group of Chiefs of African 
Navies and/or Coast Guards (CHANS) to scrutinize issues of situational awareness and 
collaborate towards the enhancement of Africa’s Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), 
and to uphold cooperative efforts between Navies/Coast Guards of the AU Member states 
and international partners.’ 19  
Although, the ASF is not fully operational, the Eastern ASF attained full operational capacity 
by the end of December 2014, a full year ahead of the ASF target of December 2015.20 
However, there is no indication that it has actually developed maritime operational capability. 
Certain scholars, such as Wambua and Engel, have criticised the stance of African states and 
the AU in operationalising its maritime security capacity. Wambua points to the lack of vessels, 
aircrafts, communications systems, appropriately trained personnel or appropriate legal 
framework, as well as African states fixation on national interests rather than ‘regional common 
good’ as obstacles to effective regional cooperation in dealing with maritime security issues.21 
While this is no doubt correct, it is important to point out that generally with regional 
cooperation as regard maritime security it is not necessarily all states in the region that are able 
to make tangible contributions. The important thing is to have certain key states with the 
capacity to act as drivers of such regional cooperation arrangements.  States, such as Nigeria 
and South Africa, have the requisite capacity to drive and make such regional maritime security 
institution workable. Furthermore, there is nothing unusual about states having a fixation on 
national interest, as this is the reality of international politics.22 The way around this is to frame 
the call for regional maritime security cooperation in such a way that individuals states are able 
to locate their national interest in such cooperative arrangement, for instance, through the 
understanding that there would be benefits in the institutionalisation of regional maritime 
security cooperation, such as shared security costs, improvement of maritime trade that would 
have a positive knock on effect on each states’ economy etc.  Engel, amongst other things, 
identified an absence of political leadership both on the Continent and the AU, as being 
                                                 
18
 Michael Baker, ‘Towards an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the African Union to Revolutionize 
the African Maritime Sector,’  (2011) 64(2) Naval War College Review, 39 at 51 
19
 Para.31 
20
 (available at http://www.africareview.com/News/East-African-Standby-Force-ready-for-peacekeeping/-
/979180/2533358/-/nryi8u/-/index.html, accessed on 8 September 2015)  
21
 Paul Musili Wambua, ‘Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation in Africa: The Planned End State’ (2009) 
18(3) African Security Review, 45 at 54 
22 See generally Hans J. Morgenthau (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson), Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace (1985) 6 ed. 
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responsible for the ‘lack of institutional and political support’ for the AIMS, especially with 
regard to maritime security.23  Potgieter and Walker, in a more recent publication, while 
agreeing that more conversations need to be had on how to give the AIMS more prominence 
in the ‘construction and institutionalization’ of the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA), however, point to the encouraging signs of various the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) embracing the ideals of AIMS with bodies like as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community 
(SADC), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) formulating their own 
maritime security strategies.24  
 
Fortunately, Africa may learn from experiences of organizations, such as the European Union 
(EU), on how they have operationalised their maritime security capabilities. It must, however, 
be stressed at this point that the utilisation of these EU institutions, as examples, is not to 
suggest the flawlessness of the EU models. Neither does the author seek to advocate a 
wholesale adoption of these models. Rather, the idea is to use EU models as institutional 
templates that the AIMS could use to develop maritime security capabilities through learning 
not only from the successes, but also from the failures of these EU bodies. While, there are 
lessons there are no doubt lessons to be learnt from the EU, such institutional templates would 
obviously need to be adapted to suit Africa’s peculiar needs and situation. An example of such 
institutions is the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR), which was launched by the 
EU on 8 December 2008 within the framework of its Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) and in response to relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) calling for 
global action to deal with the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa 
and in the Western Indian Ocean.25 The EU NAVFOR is a joint naval operation involving EU 
member States and some non-EU European States - Norway, Ukraine, Montenegro and Serbia 
– who make contributions such as navy vessels (surface combat vessels and auxiliary ships, 
including embarked helicopters); maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft (MPRA); vessel 
protection detachment (VPD) teams and the provision of military and civilian staff to work at 
the operations headquarters (OHQ) in Northwood, United Kingdom, or onboard units. The 
military assets and personnel are provided by the contributing states with running cost and 
personnel cost being met on a national basis. Although, the composition of the EU NAVFOR 
may vary, it typically consists of approximately 1200 personnel, 4 – 7 surface combat vessels 
                                                 
23
 Ulf Engel, The African Union, the African Peace and Security Architecture, and Maritime Security, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung(FES) Peace and Security Series No.13, (2014), 15-18 and 20-24, (available at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/aethiopien/10878.pdf , accessed on 8 September, 2015) 
24
 Johan Potgieter and Timothy Walker, ‘The 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy(AIMS); Content and 
Progress’ in Francois Very and Thomas Mandrup (eds.), Towards Good Order at Sea: African Experiences, 
(2015) 108  
25 See United Nations Security Council resolutions S/RES/1816 of 2 June 2008; S/RES/1838 of 7 October 2008; 
S/RES/1849 of 2 December 2008; S/RES/1851 of 16 December 2008; S/RES/1897 of 30 November 2009; 
S/RES/1918 of 27 April 2010; S/RES/1950 of 23 November 2010; S/RES/1976 of 11 April 2011; S/RES/2015 
of 24 October 2011; S/RES/2077 of 21 November 2012 and S/RES/2125 of 18 November 2013, available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/ accessed on 20 January 2016. 
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and 2 – 4 maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. 26   The AIMS provision for a 
representative continental working group of chiefs of African navies could serve as a basis to 
develop an EU NAVFOR type operation for Africa to be involved in dealing with illegal 
activities occurring at sea in the AMD, including the piracy in East Africa and the Gulf of 
Guinea.  
 
Also, there are lessons that could be learnt from another EU Agency, FRONTEX, set up to 
promote, coordinate and develop European border management, including the border at sea.27 
For instance, FRONTEX launched joint operation Triton on the November 1, 2014 to 
coordinate the deployment of three open sea patrol vessels, two coastal patrol boats, two 
aircraft and one helicopter in the Central Mediterranean, with contributions to this joint 
operation by the EU members.28 However, it is important to note that the FRONTEX is more 
of a European border agency rather than a Coast guard type arrangement. Thus, whatever 
lessons could be learnt from this European agency, the African version would need to also 
incorporate coast guard capabilities, as well.29 
 
Alternatively, instead of a continent wide naval and coastal guard operation, which may be 
logistically challenging, another option could be to devolve the joint naval and coast guard 
operations to the RECs, such as the ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS etc. This may have the 
advantage of allowing such RECs to establish joint maritime security operations that would 
prioritise maritime security issues, which are particularly important to them. For instance, 
Commander Kamal-Deen of the Ghanaian navy after identifying that maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea was increasing cautioned that: ‘…it is crucial that [such] 
initiatives be tailored to meet the needs of the region.’30 
 
Apart from some sort of joint task force to deal with the maritime threats in the AMD there is 
a need for an effective strategy to ensure that all African states have the necessary legal 
framework for the effective prosecution of pirates and other maritime criminals arrested by 
either the naval or coast guard operations. Drawing from the lessons of the Somali piracy in 
the Gulf of Arden it is clear that an arrest of pirates and other maritime criminals that is not 
complemented by an effective judicial prosecution of offenders would be inadequate. 31 
                                                 
26
 (Available at http://eunavfor.eu/home/about-us/  , accessed on 8 September, 2015)        
27
 (Available at  http://frontex.europa.eu/about-frontex/origin, accessed on 8 September 2015) 
28
 (Available at http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-
JSYpL7http://frontex.europa.eu/news/frontex-launches-joint-operation-triton-JSYpL7, accessed on 8 September 
2015)  
29
 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004  establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
(Available at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/frontex_regulation_en.pdf, accessed on 13 January, 
2014) 
30
 Kamal-Deen, op.cit. note 15 at 109. 
31
 Egede, op.cit. note 14 at 257-263  
 8 
Although, certain African states have already enacted, or are currently in the process of 
enacting the requisite legislation, there needs to be a clear strategy in developing model 
legislation for all African states to deal with all the maritime crimes indicated in the AIMS 
which should be made available to all African states.32   Consequently, there is a need for an 
African inter-governmental platform to coordinate the building up of domestic capacity of 
African states, especially with regard to enacting up-to-date legislation to effectually prosecute 
arrested offenders in their courts.  
(b) Institutional framework for an African international court to deal with African 
marine issues  
To adequately emphasise the high profile nature of maritime issues under the AIMS an African 
judicial institution with jurisdiction to settle African maritime disputes, as well as having 
complemental jurisdiction with domestic courts to prosecute maritime crimes, would be 
appropriate. However, unfortunately, the idea of such an African court is not currently 
embedded in the AIMS. Whilst, the Strategy states that the AU through its African Union (AU) 
Border Programme should make an assertive call for peaceful settlement of existing maritime 
boundary issues it does not provide any strategy for the use of some sort of judicial mechanism 
to do so.33 No doubt, the AU Border Programme has had some success in getting certain 
African States to negotiate and sign Agreements to settle maritime boundary delimitation 
issues.34 However, there would be occasions where such amicable agreement would not be 
achievable. There are instances where African states have had to resort to judicial mechanism 
to settle maritime disputes. For example, in the past there have been maritime dispute cases 
between African States decided by the International Court of Justice(ICJ), such as the Case 
Concerning the Continental Shelf(Tunisia v. Libya) 35 and Case Concerning the Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria).36  The possibility 
of maritime disputes between African states that would require judicial settlement is certainly 
not conscribed to just the past as we see from the recent case of the Maritime Delimitation in 
the Indian Ocean (Somalia v. Kenya), a  dispute concerning maritime delimitation in the Indian 
Ocean.37 In its application Somalia pointed out as follows: ‘The inability of the Parties to 
                                                 
32
 Ibid. at pp.261-262. For instance, Nigeria which is on the frontline in the fight against piracy and other maritime 
crimes in the Gulf of Guinea has recently drafted the Piracy and Other Unlawful Acts at Sea (and Other Related 
Offences) Bill which is now before the National Assembly. 
33
 Para.58 
34
 One of the justifications for establishing the AU Border Programme is ‘[t]o address the problems posed by the 
lack of delimitation and demarcation, which gives rise to “undefined zones”, within which the application of 
national sovereignty poses problems, and constitutes a real obstacle to the deepening of the integration process.’ 
(available at http://www.peaceau.org/en/page/27-au-border-programme-aubp , accessed on 9 September 2015) 
See for example the role of the AU Border Programme in the signing by Seychelles, The Comoros and Tanzania 
of Agreements on the Delimitation of their Maritime Borders. (available at http://au.int/en/content/african-
union-welcomes-signing-seychelles-comoros-and-tanzania-agreements-delimitation-their, accessed on 9 
September 2015) For a detailed study of the AU Border Programme see Gbenga Oduntan, ‘Repartitioning of 
Africa: Imperatives of the African Union Boundary Programme within Contemporary International Law and 
Practice’ (2011) 1(1) African Journal of Law and Criminology 140-203 
35
 [1985] ICJ Reports p.14 
36
 [2002] ICJ Reports p.303 
37
 Available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=00&case=161&code=SK&p3=0 , 
accessed on 9 September 2015) 
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narrow the differences between them, and the failure of the Kenyan delegation to attend the 
final meeting, have made manifest the need for judicial resolution of this dispute.’ 38 
Furthermore, there is the Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between 
the Republic of Ghana and the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire (Ghana v. Cote d’Ivoire) submitted 
to a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).39 While 
these cases attest to the fact that there are already possible international judicial mechanisms, 
such as the ICJ and ITLOS, to deal with such disputes, it is imperative, in this writer’s view, 
with regard to maritime disputes between African States, that there should be provision for 
some type of African court that African states may choose to submit such disputes, if they so 
wish. After all, the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) does 
encourage a wide variety of choice for state parties in settling their maritime disputes.40 Section 
280 of Part XV of the LOSC states: ‘Nothing in this Part impairs the right of any states parties 
to agree at any time to settle a dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application 
of this Convention by any peaceful means of their own choice.’ 
 
While section 282 of the LOSC affirms the possibility of a regional means of settling disputes 
by stating: 
 
‘If the states parties which are parties to a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention have agreed, through a general, regional or bilateral 
agreement or otherwise, that such dispute shall, at the request of any party to the dispute, 
be submitted to a procedure that entails a binding decision, that procedure shall apply in 
lieu of the procedures provided for in this Part, unless the parties to the dispute otherwise 
agree.’(Italics included for emphasis) 
 
This ‘buffet’ like approach of ‘picking and choosing’ whatever dispute settlement procedure a 
State Party to the LOSC may prefer to employ to settle disputes has been criticised. It is said 
to contribute to the proliferation of international tribunals and to raise the possibility of 
fragmentation of both substantive law and procedural law in the law of the sea. 41 However, 
there is actually no realistic evidence that a diversity of international courts/tribunals and 
arbitral bodies dealing with the Law of the Sea has actually led to any fragmentation. Judge 
Mensah, a former Judge of ITLOS, had argued that the view that a proliferation of tribunals 
would lead to a danger of fragmentation of jurisprudence or conflicting decisions was based 
                                                 
38
 Para.32 of the Application Instituting Proceedings filed in the Registry of the ICJ on 28 August 2018, 
(available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/161/18362.pdf , accessed on 9 September 2015)  
39
 See ITLOS Order 2015/1 of 12 January 2015, (available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23/C23_Ord_202015-1_12.01.15.pdf , accessed 
on 9 September 2015) 
40
 [1833 UNTS 3, (1982) 21 ILM 1245] 
41
 See Alan Boyle, ‘Dispute Settlement and Law of the Sea Convention: Problems of Fragmentation and 
Jurisdiction’, (1997) 46(1) ICLQ 37-54.   
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on mere speculation without any real empirical evidence in support. 42 It may yet be argued 
that the ‘buffet’ type approach in the LOSC is indeed an advantage because such multiplicity 
of dispute settlement mechanisms provides the necessary flexibility that would essentially 
encourage states parties to have recourse to peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than the 
alternative of the use of force.43 Providing states with a diversity of peaceful settlement of 
disputes options is very important because states' willingness to have recourse to international 
peaceful settlement mechanisms is largely founded on their trust of a particular procedure. 
Charney puts it this way: 
 
‘…I am not troubled by the multiplicity of dispute settlement systems established by the 
LOS Convention. I encourage all to embrace and nurture them so that they may fulfill their 
laudable objectives. We should celebrate the increased number of forums for third-party 
settlement found in the Convention and other international agreements because it means 
that international third-party settlement procedures, especially adjudication and 
arbitration, are becoming more acceptable. This development will promote the evolution 
of public international law and its broader acceptance by the public as a true system of 
law.’44 
 
Therefore strategically, in order to encourage states to employ peaceful settlement options 
rather than self-help, it is best to provide a wide variety of choices, both at the global and 
regional levels, with states having the option to pick whatever option they are comfortable with. 
Moreover, having a number of Courts with identical jurisdiction would actually result in shared 
workload, as no single Court would be able to cope with the sheer number of cases if a number 
of states decide to use that Court to settle their disputes. Besides, the concern about 
fragmentation of the law is simply not convincing. As long as the different courts are manned 
by judges with expertise in the particular field of international law there would generally be 
consistency as the judges would mostly rely on established principles in the area of law, 
including those determined by other courts in the field. An example of this is with regard to 
the first boundary delimitation case before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS), the Dispute Concerning the Maritime Boundary between Bangladesh and Myanmar 
in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar), where the ITLOS relied heavily on decisions 
of other international courts, such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ). 45 
                                                 
42
 Thomas Mensah, ‘The Role of Peaceful Settlement in Contemporary Ocean Policy and Law’ in Vidas D and 
Ostreng, W., (eds.), Order for the Oceans at the Turn of the Century, (1999), 81 at 92 
43
 See Art. 279 of LOSC which places a general obligation on States Parties to resolve their disputes through 
peaceful means. Also see Article 33(1) of the United Nations Charter.  See also Thomas Mensah, ‘The Dispute 
Settlement Regime of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, (1998)2 Max Planck 
Yearbook of United Nations Law 307 at 323. 
44
 Jonathan Charney, ‘Implications of Expanding International Dispute Settlement Systems: the 1982 
Convention on the Law of the Sea’, (1996) 90(1) AJIL 69 at  73-74 
45
 Case No.16, Judgement of 14 March 2012, (available at 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/C16_Judgment_14_03_2012_rev.pdf., 
accessed on 10 September 2015) See Robin Churchill, “The Bangladesh/Myanmar Case: Continuity and 
Novelty in the Law of Maritime Boundary Delimitation,” (2012) 1(1) Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 137-152 for an analysis of the case. 
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 If the AIMS is intended to provide an African flavor to engaging with maritime issues it is 
pertinent that African states should be given the opportunity to choose, if they so wish, to 
submit maritime disputes amongst themselves to an African court or tribunal that is conferred 
with jurisdiction to settle such maritime disputes and also able to deal with other key marine 
issues addressed by the AIMS. Presently, there is no provision in the AIMS for such a judicial 
body. Clearly, in the course of the negotiation and drafting of the AIMS no consideration was 
given to this very important issue. However, it is argued, rather than embarking on the 
obviously expensive venture of setting up another brand new court, a practical way to go about 
this is to link the AIMS strategy with the anticipated African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights. It is proposed that the Strategy incorporates the yet to be established African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights with the further need to amend the protocol establishing this court 
to provide for it to have specific jurisdiction to deal with maritime and law of the sea issues.  
 
The African Court of Justice and Human Rights, which is intended to be a merger between two 
African Courts, namely the yet to be established African Court of Justice and the already 
functioning African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, was initiated due to concerns by 
African Heads of State about the cost of running two separate African Union Courts.46 A 
protocol on the merger has been adopted by the AU Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments in July 2008, which was amended in November 2010 and May 2014 
respectively.47 The 2008 protocol established two chambers - the General Affairs and the 
Human Rights chambers.48 While the 2010 Amendment added to the General Affairs and 
Human Rights sections, a new International Criminal Law section.49 Additionally, the 2014 
Amendment under a heading ‘Assignment of matters to sections of the court’ states: 
 
‘1.The General Affairs section shall be competent to hear all cases submitted under Article 
28 of the Statute [such as the interpretation and application of the AU Constitutive Act and 
other AU treaties, as well as acts, decisions, regulations and directives of the organs of the 
                                                 
46
 See DECISION ON THE MERGER OF THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
AND THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE AFRICAN UNION – ASSEMBLY/AU/6(V), Decision no. 
Assembly/AU/Dec.83(V), Assembly of the African Union, Fifth Ordinary Session 4-5 July 2005 and Sonya 
Sceats, “Africa’s New Human Rights Court: Whistling in the Wind?”, Chatham House briefing paper, March 
2009, (available at 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/International%20Law/bp0309sceats.p
df , accessed on 10 September 2015) 
47
 See Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, July 2008; Draft Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,  Legal/ACJHR-
PAP/4(II) Rev.2 of November 2010 and Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, STC/Legal/Min/7(I) Rev. 1 of May, 2014, (available at 
http://www.africancourtcoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=18&Ite
mid=27&lang=en  and https://www.iccnow.org/documents/African_Court_Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf , accessed 
on 10 September 2015)  
48
 See Art.19 of the Annex Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
49
 See Art.10 of the Annex of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human & Peoples’ Rights 
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AU, any question of international law etc.] except those assigned to the Human and 
Peoples Rights section and the International Criminal Law section as specified in this 
Article; 
2. The Human and Peoples Rights section shall be competent to hear all cases relating to 
human and people’s rights. 
3. The International Criminal Law section shall be competent to hear all cases relating to 
the crimes specified in this Statute.’ 50 
 
It would seem, that the General Affairs section as it is framed, has a wide enough jurisdiction 
to have the competence to adjudicate on law of the sea cases, since it may consider cases on 
any question of international law, which would obviously include international law of the sea, 
a branch of international law.51  Notwithstanding, it would be preferable to have a separate 
section on the international law of the sea to drive home the significance of the so-called ‘blue 
economy’ to Africa. Due to the rather technical and specialised nature of this branch of 
international law this separate section should be constituted by judges who are acknowledged 
international law of sea experts.  This could actually be done without a formal amendment of 
the protocol as the 2014 Amendment allows for the creation of additional chambers (or 
sections) apart from the three ones that are specifically mentioned.52 Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that the International Criminal Law section of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, amongst its competence, has criminal jurisdiction over some of the criminal and illegal 
activities mentioned in the AIMS such as piracy, terrorism, and trafficking in persons, drugs 
and hazardous wastes and the illicit exploitation of natural resources. It is recommended that 
the competence of this section be further amended to take account of other maritime crimes 
listed in the AIMS that are not currently included in the protocol.53 
Currently, there are only 5 ratifications - Benin, Burkina Faso, Congo, Libya and Mali – of the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,54 and it would only 
enter into force thirty (30) days after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by fifteen 
(15) Member States.55 There is therefore a need to encourage other AU Member States to 
hasten progress on the ratification of the protocol.   
 
The Strategy needs to be more explicit on a regional judicial arrangement for dealing with 
African marine issues. The proposal in this section of the article argues for an African peaceful 
settlement judicial mechanism to settle strictly African maritime disputes, as well as other 
marine issues arising from the AIMS. Further, it is expected that this African international 
                                                 
50
 See Art.7 of the Annex of the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human & Peoples’ Rights 
51
 Art.28 of the Annex  
52
 See Art.9 of the Annex  of the Statute 
53
 See for instance, armed robbery, money laundering and illegal arms trafficking. See para. 63 of AIM Strategy. 
54
 Available at http://au.int/en/treaties , accessed on 10 September 2015 
55
 Art.9 
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judicial structure would complement the domestic courts in prosecuting maritime crimes 
committed with the AMD.  
 
(c) Institutional framework for the outer limit of the continental shelf 
The outer limit of the continental shelf (or the extended CS) is mentioned in passing in the 
AIMS.56 It however provides no strategy as to how to secure and harness this part of the sea 
for African coastal states and also how to help the States to fulfil their obligations under the 
LOSC. Under the LOSC broad shelf coastal states may claim for an extended CS by making 
submissions to a body set up for this purpose, the United Nations Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf (CLSC). 57 Although, it is not clear the exact number of states in Africa 
that actually have extended CS, a number of African coastal states have already made 
submissions, as well as preliminary information indicative of the outer limits of the continental 
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles to the CLCS. 58 This part of the CS, which contains tremendous 
natural resources that could generate wealth for African states blessed with such extended CS 
and potentially provide necessary funds to promote development in such states, has been 
described  rather dramatically as creating the  ‘potential to gain new territory… without going 
to war.’59  In 2008, the African Union Assembly at its tenth ordinary session, engaged with the 
issue of the extended CS of African coastal states and adopted a decision that was stated to be 
made with the consciousness of: ‘the major geopolitical and strategic stakes linked to the 
African continental shelf and of its abundant mineral and biological resources, which constitute 
an important source of foreign currency earnings for the economic development of the 
continent.’60 The task therefore before African coastal states with extended CS is to first secure 
their extended CS in line with LOSC. Presently, a number of African broad shelf states who 
were due to make their submissions by May 2009 cutoff date  were unable to do so due to the 
complexities and technicalities involved in the preparation of submissions, as well as the cost 
implications.61 The States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                                 
56
 See Para.59 of AIM Strategy which states: ‘Member States shall be encouraged to claim their respective 
maritime limits, including their extended continental shelf where applicable’ and urges member States to accept 
and fulfil all responsibilities and obligations that arise from the establishment of maritime zones as required by 
the LOSC and the IMO SOLAS Conventions.   
57
 Art.76(4)-(9) of LOSC 
58
 (available at  http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_submissions.htm and 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_preliminary.htm respectively, access on 10 September 
2015). See also 
 E. Egede, ‘The outer limits of the continental shelf: African states and the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention’, 
(2004)35(2) ODIL, 157-178. 
59
 A statement attributed to Ian McLachlan, the project leader of South Africa’s extended CS claim. See Irma 
Venter, ‘Australia will be first to excel at mining the Ocean floor – Canadian Prof’, Mining 
Weekly Online, 14 March 2008, cited in Edwin Egede, ‘Africa and Extended Continental Shelf under the Law of 
the Sea Convention(LOSC) 1982’, (2012) Journal Jurisprudence 173 at 179-180. 
60
 Decision on Extension of the African Continental Shelf and Climate Change, Doc.EX.CL/391 
(XII), Decisions and Declarations of the 10th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, 31 
January-2 February 2008, available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_31_JANUARY_2_FEBRUARY_2008_AUC_TENT
H_ORDINARY_SESSION_DECISIONS_AND_DECLARATIONS.pdf , accessed on 10 September 2015) 
61
 See Egede, op.cit. note 58 and note 59 at 181-192. See also Chris Carleton, ‘Article 76 of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea – Implementation Problems from the Technical Perspective’, (2006) 21(3) IJMCL 287 at 
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(SPLOS), in response to the concerns of certain developing states, including some in Africa, 
that they would be unable to meet the May 2009 deadline, decided that a coastal state could 
meet this cutoff date by merely submitting to the United Nations Secretary-General before the 
deadline a preliminary information indicative of the extended continental shelf, along with a 
description of the status of preparation and the intended date of making the actual submission.  
This decision is, however, clear that pending the receipt of the actual submission the CLCS 
would not consider such preliminary information.62 A number of African coastal states fall 
within the category of states that have merely submitted their preliminary information, which 
as mentioned above does not amount to an actual submission to the CLCS, but may allow them 
to progress to such actual submission.  It must be noted that under the LOSC only limits of the 
extended CS established on the basis of the recommendations of the CLCS would be regarded 
as ‘final and binding.’63 It is therefore necessary to have some type of institutional framework 
that would co-ordinate the efforts to ensure that all African broad-shelf states are able to secure 
their extended CS by making the appropriate submissions to the CLCS. Although, the LOSC 
currently allows the CLCS to provide scientific and technical advice on such submissions, there 
is a need for a body under the auspices of the AU to provide a forum to advise and assist African 
broad shelf states in a manner that meets the peculiar needs of Africa.64 This institutional role 
may be carried out under the auspices of the African Union (AU) Border Project which has as 
one of its aims the need: ‘to address the problems posed by the lack of delimitation and 
demarcation, which gives rise to “undefined zones”…’ and has as one of its crucial strategic 
objectives the aspiration of ‘[f]acilitating and supporting the delimitation and demarcation of 
African boundaries where such exercise has not yet taken place,’ and has had some, though 
rather limited experience, in this area.65   As an African wide institution it could provide 
coordinated assistance to such states that need to secure their extended CS by making 
submissions to the CLCS. Its’ role would be advisory and consultative since issues with regard 
to the CS are a matter within coastal states’ competence.66 It would also serve as a platform to 
bring together all the African members of the CLCS, as well as African experts in relevant 
disciplines such as geology, geophysics, hydrology or international law of sea, who have 
                                                 
288, 306.  Further, for e.g. Mauritius and Seychelles, had explicitly stated in their submission to the CLCS that 
they faced significant challenges “posed by geographical isolation, technical capacity and financial resources” 
(See Para.1.11 of Executive Summary) and also Ghana pointed out that their submission was prepared 
“notwithstanding significant challenges posed by technical capacity and financial resources.”(See Para. 1.6 of 
the Executive Summary), (available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_musc.htm , accessed on 10 September 
2015) 
62
 Para 1(a) and (b) of SPLOS/183 of 24 June 2008 
63
 See Art.76(8) of LOSC 
64 See Annex 3(1)(b) of Annex II of LOSC. It is interesting to note that so far the CLCS Subcommittee dealing 
with this is yet to receive any request from a Coastal State for Scientific and Technical Advice. See Para.59, 
CLCS/88 of 20 April 2015, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/112/55/PDF/N1511255.pdf?OpenElement  , accessed  on 13 January 2016 
65
 Available at  http://www.aubis.peaceau.org/fr/about-us , accessed on 10 September 2015. See Para. 7 of the 
Pan-African Conference on Maritime Boundaries and the Continental Shelf for the Implementation of the 
African Union Border Programme Conclusions, Accra, Ghana, 9-10 November 2009, (available at 
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/conclusions-accra-eng-.pdf, accessed on 9 September 2015) and Gbenga 
Oduntan, International Law and Boundary Disputes in Africa, (2015) 112-113 
66
 See Art.78 of LOSC 
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expertise in this area, to provide expert advice to African coastal states who need assistance 
with respect to their submissions to the CLCS.67 Although, there are adequate information in 
the public domain on bodies in the international sphere that could provide such expert technical 
advice and information on possible sources of finance with regard to submissions to the CLCS, 
the AUBP could act as a one-stop shop to point African coastal states who need such 
information in the right direction.68  
 
Clearly, securing the extended CS is merely part, albeit a crucial part, of the process, as there 
would also be a need for such coastal states to actually exploit this part of the sea and to comply 
with their obligations under LOSC, especially with regard to Article 82.  Under Article 82 the 
coastal states are to make annual payments or contributions in kind to the International Seabed 
Authority (ISA) in respect of exploitation of non-living resources in this part of the CS for 
distribution amongst states parties to the convention.69 This obligation begins in the sixth year 
of production at 1% of the value of volume of all production in the site (except the resources 
used in connection with exploitation). It would increase by one per cent every year until the 
twelfth year where it hits the ceiling of 7% and it thereafter remains at 7%.70  The only states 
that are exempt from making this payment or contribution in kind are developing states that 
are net importers of a mineral resource produced from its continental shelf.71  The AU Border 
Programme   could also be given the remit, working closely with the AU’s office of the legal 
counsel, to assist African states in putting in place the appropriate legislative framework to 
comply with their Article 82 obligation and any other obligation with regard to the extended 
CS, through for example, designing model legislation and model agreements between a state 
and potential multinational corporations (MNCs).72  
 
In essence, there is need to have a more detailed and coherent institutional framework 
provisions in the AIMS to coordinate and provide a more Continent wide strategic approach in 
assisting broad shelf African coastal states to secure and harness the extended CS, as well as 
to comply with obligations imposed by LOSC as regards this resource rich part of the sea.    
 
 
                                                 
67
 There are five African members of the CLCS, currently, E. Kaingui (Cameroon), I.O. Oduro (Ghana), S. 
Njuguna(Kenya), E.S. Mahanjane (Mozambique) and  L.F. Awosika (Nigeria), (available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_members.htm#Members , accessed on 10 September 2015) 
68
 On information available in public domain on this,  see for instance, the advice and assistance section of the 
CLCS website, ( available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm , accessed on 10 September 
2015) and Egede, op.cit note 59 at 184-192. 
69
 Art.82(1) and (4) 
70
 Art.82 (2) 
71
 Art.82(3) 
72 See International Seabed Authority(ISA), Implementation of Article 82 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, ISA Technical Study No.12, (2013), (available at 
https://www.isa.org.jm/sites/default/files/files/documents/ts12-web.pdf , accessed on 10 September 2015) 
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(d) An institutional framework for deep seabed mining activities. 
Interestingly, the AIMS does not in any way engage with the issue of the deep seabed beyond 
national jurisdiction (the Area), which is the common heritage of mankind (CHM), even though 
African states played a prominent in pushing for this relatively new regime.73 In this section, it 
is argued that that the omission of the AIMS to engage with this part of the sea is a major flaw 
which needs to be remedied, especially since it is intended to be a long-lasting strategy. 
Furthermore, it is argued that there is a need for a strategy for an appropriate institutional 
framework to enable Africa engage with this important part of the sea. The AIMS’ failure to 
engage with the Area could probably be due to a rather narrow perception of what constitutes 
the African Maritime Domain (AMD). The Strategy, in its main body, appears to give the 
impression that it is more concerned with activities with regard to the maritime zones within 
national jurisdiction of African coastal States (i.e. the internal waters, territorial seas, exclusive 
economic zones and continental shelves etc.). However, a close scrutiny of the definition of 
the AMD as provided in Annex B of the Strategy would reveal that the AMD is not necessarily 
limited to only the maritime zones within national jurisdiction. It maintains that the AMD: 
 
 … refers to all areas and resources of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on 
an African sea, ocean, or African lakes, intra-coastal and inland navigable waterways, 
including all African maritime-related activities, infrastructure, cargo, vessels and other 
means of conveyance. It also includes the air above the African seas, oceans, lakes, intra-
coastal and inland navigable waterways and to the oceans’ electromagnetic spectrum as 
well. 
 
Although, this definition of the AMD is rather convoluted, it would appear to suggest that for 
the purposes of the Strategy, the AMD could extend to ‘areas and resources’ that are adjacent 
to the so-called African seas, which, arguably, could be said to include parts of the deep seabed 
Area contiguous to maritime zones of African states. Besides, it is argued that even if it is 
accepted that the AMD under the Strategy is limited to maritime zones within national 
jurisdiction such an approach is a rather restricted and narrow one. For instance, the European 
Union (EU) blue growth Strategy, an integral part of the EU Integrated maritime policy, is 
broadly framed to also include deep seabed mining in the Area.74 Thus, it is argued that the 
AIMS should similarly adopt a more broad-based approach, which would include a position 
with regard to the deep seabed Area. This is all the more so as the preamble of the LOSC rightly 
identifies ‘that the problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be considered 
as a whole.’75 For instance, in the case of the deep seabed Area, there is a strong linkage 
between the continental shelf (CS) and the Area, the latter being the CHM. Hence, the outer 
limit of the CS of coastal States is what is used to delineate the Area as the latter is defined as: 
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 Edwin Egede, Africa and the Deep Seabed Regime: Politics and International Law of the Common Heritage 
of Mankind, (2011), ch 1. 
74
 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/blue_growth/index_en.htm , accessed on 10 September 
2015. 
75
 Preamble 3. 
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“…the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”76 
In addition, there is the possibility that resources may actually straddle between the Area and 
national jurisdictions of nearby states, including certain African coastal states.77 Furthermore, 
any mining activities in the Area close to the African continent would certainly have some 
environmental impact on the maritime zones of adjacent African states and may potentially 
impact economic activities within the maritime zones of African states, such as fisheries 
activities etc. Bearing this in mind, it is important to note that Article194 of LOSC imposes a 
general obligation on states to protect the marine environment both within and outside national 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, it is in the vital strategic interest of African states to participate in deep 
seabed mining activities, which potentially, with the increasing development of marine 
technology, may end up being an alternative source for key mineral resources such as copper, 
cobalt, gold, silver, manganese, lithium and manganese, and thereby compete with similar 
resources produced by certain African states either within their terrestrial or maritime 
territories. For instance, African states, such as Zambia, Botswana, Morocco, South Africa, 
Namibia, Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe are land-based producers of copper 
and cobalt. While Africa states, such as South Africa, are major producers of gold. In addition, 
there is the potential, though rather slim, of locating petroleum resources in the Area, which 
could compete with such resources located in African states. 78  Furthermore, there is the 
possibility of locating methane (gas) hydrates, which are ice-like crystalline compounds 
consisting of gas (usually methane) and water molecules located both on continental margins 
and in the Area. 79  It is believed that methane hydrates would provide one of the most important 
energy sources in the future.80   Thus, significant African oil and gas producers, such as Angola, 
Gabon and Nigeria, should have an interest in this possibility of locating oil and gas, as well 
as methane hydrates, as the latter could be an alternative source of energy. 81  The EU, for 
instance, has evinced an appreciation of the strategic importance of this evolving industry. For 
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 See Art.142 of LOSC 
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 V.I Vysotsky and A.I. Gloumov, ‘Petroleum Potential and Development Prospects in Deep –Sea Areas of the 
World’, in International Seabed Authority (ed.), Minerals other than Polymetallic Nodules in the Seabed: 
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instance, a recent study commissioned by the EU on deep seabed mining identified that: 
‘[b]ringing in a new source for metal supply, particularly located in international waters, may 
alleviate the price competition and provide more security for Europe.’82 This of course is at 
variance with the interest of African States producing similar minerals and thus indicates a 
need to have a clear strategy reflecting some kind of African position with regard to deep 
seabed mining activities.   
 
Furthermore, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in a report prepared in 2012, recognised 
that potentially there could be huge economic benefits which could accrue to African 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states that sponsor deep seabed mining exploitation in the Area.83 
The report pointed out that potentially this could benefit such states in the following ways: by 
contributing to its government revenues through taxes and/or royalties, by creating jobs and 
training opportunities, as well as strengthening the domestic private sector, encouraging 
foreign investment, the funding of public service improvements, contributing to infrastructure 
development and supporting other economic sectors.84 Further, the EU  has identified probable 
benefits and opportunities for EU based companies that may engage in deep seabed mining 
exploitation. For instance, in a communication from the EU Commission to the European 
Parliament, as well as some other bodies of the EU, the Commission stated: ‘If this expansion 
in extracting minerals from the [deep] seafloor does take place, European companies, with their 
long experience in specialized ships an underwater handling, are currently well positioned to 
provide high-quality products and services.’85 It is thus astonishing that the AIMS with its 
central aim of improving the blue economy does not in any way engage with this maritime 
industry that conceivable may be a central part of mineral exploitation in the future. 
 
In addition, despite the various ongoing activities in preparation for eventual commercial 
exploitation of Area, as well as the sensitization seminar on the work of the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA), and the secretary-general of the ISA’s presentation to the Commission 
of the African Union,86 it is rather remarkable that the drafters of the AIMS did not touch on 
this regime nor develop any strategy on this. Recently, the deputy to the secretary-general of 
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the ISA at a seminar held in South Africa expressed concerns over the lack of participation by 
African states in the deep seabed regime.87This is even more so since the LOSC, after declaring 
the Area and its resources as CHM, goes on to explicitly encourage the participation of 
developing states in deep seabed activities by stating:  
 
The effective participation of developing States in activities in the Area shall be promoted 
as specifically provided for in this Part, having due regard to their special interests and 
needs, and in particular to the special need of the land-locked and geographically 
disadvantaged among them to overcome obstacles arising from their disadvantaged 
location, including remoteness from the Area and difficulty of access to and from it.88 
 
To date the ISA has issued Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic 
Nodules in the Area (adopted 13 July 2000), which was later updated and adopted on 25 July 
2013; the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulphides in the Area 
(adopted 7 May 2010) and the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich 
Crusts (adopted 27 July 2012).89  Currently, the ISA is working on draft Regulations with 
regard to exploitation of mineral resources in the Area.90 With improving technology there is 
a growing interest in the Area and presently there are twenty six contractors, both state owned 
and private enterprises, which have engaged with activities in the Area by obtaining exploration 
contracts from the ISA. Out of all the regional groupings, only Africa is not represented 
amongst this contractors.91 With the expected increase in global demand for natural resources, 
and the gradual depletion of onshore and near offshore resources due to such demand, it is 
likely that more and more  attention would directed towards exploiting the Area. It is therefore 
imperative for Africa to have, as part of the AIMS, some sort of strategy towards promoting 
Africa's engagement with this future mineral rich ‘frontier’. A well-thought out strategy on 
deep seabed mining would ensure that, at some point, African states and their nationals, both 
natural and juridical, would have the opportunity to engage in deep seabed mining activities in 
this part of the sea. Also, it would facilitate the development of appropriate institutions that 
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would enable Africa to actively participate in this vital regime of the sea. Although, deep 
seabed mining is a capital intensive industry, which may be burdensome to single African states 
to embark upon on their own, this may be overcome by African states pooling resources 
together, under the auspices of the AU, in order to engage in seabed mining activities in the 
Area, and thus climb on the deep seabed mining ‘ladder’.92 It is pertinent here to mention that 
the idea of an African institution to engage in deep seabed mining was actually proposed as far 
back as 1988, during the third regional minerals conference held at Kampala, where the idea 
of forming an African deep seabed mining corporation was put forward. However, nothing 
came out of this.93 While it is appreciated that this did not come to fruition in 1988 when the 
possibility of deep seabed exploitation was remote, it is incomprehensible that there is currently 
no strategy for the establishment of such an institution under the AIMS, especially with the 
imminence of deep seabed exploitation and since states, corporations and other entities in other 
regional groupings in the world are already engaging with what promises to be a major source 
of mineral wealth for the future.94 Africa needs to have a strategy to put in place some type of 
African deep seabed mining corporation that would participate in the exploitation of this part 
of the sea.  On the other hand, a more short-term strategy option to engage in deep seabed 
mining, pending the establishment of such African corporation, is the approach adopted by 
certain Pacific states. For instance, Nautilus Minerals Inc., an MNC, incorporated local 
subsidiaries, namely Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. and Tonga Offshore Mining Limited, in the 
Republic of Nauru and the Kingdom of Tonga respectively, and the local companies were 
sponsored by the state where they have been incorporated for work plans for explorations in 
the part of the Area reserved by the ISA for developing countries.95  This could be an option 
available to African states, with the possibility of such states acquiring some equity interest in 
such subsidiary corporations and also encouraging their nationals to do so, if they wish. 
  
One of the key issues that states would have to engage with in regard to deep seabed mining is 
the impact such mining activities in the Area would have on the protection of the environment. 
For instance recently the G7 identified that one of the key priorities with this regime is: 
'enhancing the effective protection of the marine environment from harmful effects that may 
arise from deep sea mining' and therefore they committed themselves: 'to taking a 
precautionary approach in deep sea mining activities, and to conducting environmental impact 
assessments and scientific research.'96  As would be recalled, the ITLOS Seabed Disputes 
Chambers in its advisory opinion on Responsibilities and Obligations of States sponsoring 
persons and entities with respect to activities in the Area (Request for Advisory Opinion 
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submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber), pointed out that state laws and regulations 
governing seabed mining should be 'no less effective than international rules, regulations and 
procedures' such as the LOSC and the ISA Mining Codes. It also declared that states, both 
developed and developing, have a direct obligation to ensure that seabed mining activities are 
carried out in accordance with the precautionary approach, while employing best 
environmental practice and conducting effective prior environmental impact assessment. The 
Chambers made it clear that with regard to the responsibilities and liabilities of sponsoring 
States under the LOSC there would be no preferential treatment given to sponsoring States that 
are developing states.97 Therefore, all African states would need to adopt appropriate national 
legislative framework that would ensure that any entity located within their territory complies 
with best environmental practice and actually conducts appropriate environmental impact 
assessment and generally complies with all relevant international obligations.98 In addition to 
environmental protection, such legislation would have to deal with other pertinent issues, such 
as foreign investment and fiscal management of deep seabed mining, as well as seek to regulate 
possible tensions between deep seabed mining activities and other competing activities, for e.g. 
fisheries, maritime transport, conservation of marine species, research, laying down of 
submarine telecommunications cables etc., 99 which may impact the domestic economy. Thus, 
there would be need for a coordinating body, perhaps in liaison with the African Union office 
of the legal counsel, to develop model deep seabed legislation and seek to encourage interested 
African states to get their legislature to enact appropriate legislation on this. Although, there 
are potentially several bodies that could take up this role if there mandate is expanded,100 the 
recently launched African Minerals Development Centre(AMDC), established to strategically 
coordinate the implementation of the African Mining Vision(AMV), provided with a specific 
expanded mandate with regard to deep seabed mining, could be an appropriate coordinating 
institution.101 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
Undoubtedly, the AIM Strategy is a momentous achievement that charts new ‘waters’ with 
regard to African marine policy. It introduces a number of innovative and intriguing institutions 
such as the Oceans and Seas Research Institute of Africa (OSERIA), a Strategic Foresight 
Marine Task Force (SEMTE), and the Compensation Fund etc. However, this article has sought 
to identify some gaps in the institutional framework of the Strategy, with regards to certain 
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important areas of concerns in the sea, such as maritime security enforcement, an African 
international judicial mechanism dealing with marine matters, the outer limits of the 
continental shelf and deep seabed regime. It argues for a reconsideration of the AIM Strategy 
with regard to these important issues and a provision of a clearer strategy on the appropriate 
institutional framework to engage with these key matters. There is no doubt that appropriate 
and effective institutions are what drives the implementation of any policy vision. There must 
therefore be clear political will to operationalise the relevant institutions, both those already 
covered by the Strategy and those proposed in this article, for the vision of harnessing the 
African blue economy to be achieved. Without a clear strategy with regard to putting in place 
such institutions, it is likely that the AIM Strategy could end up being a hollow shell having no 
real impact on Africa's engagement with its adjoining seas.  
